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Intergenerational Environmental Justice and the
Climate Crisis: Thinking with and beyond the Charter
Dayna Nadine Scott and Garance Malivel
ABSTRACT
Inspired by the analysis developed in the article “Coming of Age in a
Warming World: The Charter’s Section 15 Equality Guarantee and YouthLed Climate Litigation,” by Nathalie Chalifour, Jessica Earle, and Laura
Macintyre, this commentary explores the concept of intergenerational
environmental justice in the climate crisis. Our central contribution is to
advance a relational conception of intergenerational environmental
justice, which we argue can overcome some common objections to
thinking about justice and rights in “generational” terms. This analysis
supports climate litigation efforts on Charter grounds, best conceived in
our view as discrimination against young and future generations. Yet it
also highlights the need to advance intergenerational environmental
justice outside of a narrow constitutional focus and, hence, puts forward
various institutional, legislative, and deliberative mechanisms designed to
uphold long-term interests in environmental governance processes.
Even if we don’t have a clear sense of the exact solutions to fix the future,
we should have a clear sense of how we want to feel in ourselves, in our
relationships with each other, in community, and in relationship to the
planet. Those feelings aren’t for the far-off future, they are guidance to
what we must be seeding and practicing now, right now.
— adrienne maree-brown, “Additional Recommendations for Us Right
Now from a Future”
I. INTRODUCTION
What happens, legally speaking, when we start to think about climate justice
in generational terms? Mounting evidence has shown the disproportionate
vulnerability of children and future generations to the impacts of climate
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change. As is the case between people in the global North and those in the
global South, it is also true with respect to today’s generations versus those of
the future that those who face the most extreme burdens from climate change
are those that bear the least responsibility for the emissions that cause it. But
young people are speaking up and standing up. They are doing what Naomi
Klein has said will be “this generation’s” necessary work: “fight[ing] to
protect the habitability of the planet.”1 As those being harmed and anticipating
harm begin to turn to the courts for remedies, a question has emerged: are we
“discriminating” against young people and future generations? If so, the
instincts of lawyers trained in Canada may lead them to say: we should use
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stop it.2
Inspired by the analysis developed in the article “Coming of Age in a
Warming World: The Charter’s Section 15 Equality Guarantee and Youth-Led
Climate Litigation,” by Nathalie Chalifour, Jessica Earle, and Laura
Macintyre, this commentary explores the avenues for those of us in current
generations to live up to our obligations (in the multiple ways they may be
conceived) to young people and future generations. 3 Chalifour, Earle, and
Macintyre argue that government conduct related to climate change constitutes
unjustifiable discrimination under section 15 of the Charter, whether that
conclusion can be arrived at through thinking about climate injustice as age
discrimination or as discrimination against young and future generations.
Beyond the tactical, evidentiary, and doctrinal considerations of
launching challenges under various specific sections of the Charter (which
we will leave to the litigators), we focus in this article on the broader
implications of taking different tacks. What does it mean to think about
climate justice in individual rights terms versus collective justice terms? Is
it right to think about the interests of various generations as “competing” or
“rival”? Is constitutional protection of future generations sufficient to
redress intergenerational environmental injustices? We conclude that, while
we support the general thrust of the youth claimants’ cases and we know
they must succeed, conceiving of the youth climate justice claims being
brought forward today in collective terms—on behalf of “generations”
rather than individuals—is a closer fit to the core of the justice problems that
confront us. Conceiving of the problem as one of intergenerational
1

2

3

Quoted in Colin Groundwater, “A Better Way to Think About Climate Change and the
Kids Conundrum,” GQ Magazine (26 February 2021), online: <www.gq.com/story/
naomi-klein-on-climate-change-modern-lovers> [https://perma.cc/3WG3-A6U4].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Nathalie Chalifour, Jessica Earle & Laura Macintyre “Coming of Age in a
Warming World: The Charter’s Section 15 Equality Guarantee and Youth-Led
Climate Litigation” (2021) 17:1 JL & Equality 1.
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environmental justice is closer to “how we want to feel in ourselves, in our
relationships with each other, in community, and in relationship to the
planet,” to evoke adrienne maree brown’s words in the epigraph above.4
Further, we believe the intra-generational justice aspects of the climate
crisis are at least as significant as the intergenerational ones. But the classrelated injustice of climate change is an element that we have had to concede
the Charter will not remedy, at least on the basis of jurisprudence to date.
We do illuminate a path, however, for Charter jurisprudence to move
towards a more relational account of intergenerational equity that opens up
space for an integrated analysis of the intersecting axes of privilege and
oppression on which the climate crisis gains momentum. In the end, we
agree that explicitly recognizing the rights of young people and future
generations under section 15 of the Charter is a necessary step—climate
change is a justice issue, and the equality section is the tool we are holding.
But, at the same time, we want to underscore the glaring insufficiency of
using the Charter for fully addressing the scope and scale of the problem.
For this reason, we also look at tactics outside of Charter litigation.
Here, we further contend that bolder action should be taken to inscribe
intergenerational environmental justice into binding legislative and
institutional frameworks. Building on growing international efforts to
incorporate intergenerational equity principles into legislative and
parliamentary processes, Part IV of this article seeks to envision some of
these frameworks that could adequately complement the recognition of the
rights of future generations under the Charter. We make these offerings
generously in the spirit of contributing to an “unknown, multiplicitous
future.”5 That is, we cannot know the world into which future generations
will emerge, but we can nevertheless begin to build the legal infrastructure
necessary to support life: this will take on new organic forms “that are not
echoes of the old” but, rather, that emerge from the foundation we provide
into unique forms based on the “work of future communities.” 6 In our
vision, these will be vital, plural, life-supporting, legal, and political
infrastructures that focus as much on “responsibilities” as “rights” and

4

5

6

adrienne maree-brown, “Additional Recommendations for Us Right Now from
a Future” (23 October 2020), online: Center for Humans and Nature
<www.humansandnature.org/additional-recommendations-for-us-right-nowfrom-a-future> [https://perma.cc/8S4W-EKKY].
Catriona Sandilands, “Humus” in John Hausdoerffer et al, eds, WhatKind of Ancestor
Do You Want to Be? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021) 177 at 179.
Ibid at 180.
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build capacity for restoring and nurturing the interconnected socioecological systems that support a stable climate for all.
The article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, we advance a relational
conception of intergenerational environmental justice more in line with
feminist and decolonial thinking about the future in a warming world. In
Part III, we consider class, age, and future generations as available grounds
or “boxes” under and in which a Charter claim is conceivable and as axes
of discrimination on which climate change is acting. We conclude that a
claim based on discrimination against young and future generations best
captures the core of the climate justice problem, and we demonstrate that
some common objections to thinking about justice and rights in
“generational” terms (such as “non-reciprocity”) can be overcome with
recourse to the relational account outlined in Part II. In Part IV, we broaden
the discussion to consider implementation mechanisms that might,
alongside or outside of litigation efforts, actualize the interests of future
generations. To that end, we explore a set of institutional, legislative, and
deliberative instruments elaborated in various countries to entrench longterm interests in environmental governance processes.
II. THINKING ABOUT JUSTICE IN GENERATIONAL TERMS
Legal discourse considering justice in generational terms has largely
centred on the concept of “intergenerational equity” formulated by Edith
Brown Weiss now over thirty years ago. In Brown Weiss’s conception,
“each generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from
previous generations and holds it in trust for future generations.” 7 The
basic premise, heavily influenced by liberal political theory, is that the
present generation is both entitled to benefit from the natural environment
and obligated to preserve it for future generations. 8 Having identified

7

8

Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law,
Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1989) at 2 [Brown Weiss, In Fairness].
Ibid at 21. Brown Weiss relies on John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). See e.g. Christine M Koggel, Perspectives
on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1997); Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1988); Susan Moller Okin, Gender, Justice and the Family
(New York: Basic Books, 1989). For a discussion of intergenerational justice in
the works of Rawls and other philosophers operating in the Rawlsian tradition,
see David Heyd, “A Value or an Obligation? Rawls on Justice to Future
Generations” in Axel Gosseries & Lukas H Meyer, eds, Intergenerational Justice
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 167.
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“generations” as her core unit of analysis, Brown Weiss elaborates three
core “principles” of intergenerational equity:
First, each generation should be required to conserve the
diversity of the natural and cultural resource base, so that
it does not unduly restrict the options available to future
generations in solving their problems and satisfying their
own values, and should also be entitled to diversity
comparable to that enjoyed by previous generations. This
principle is called “conservation of options.” Second,
each generation should be required to maintain the quality
of the planet so that it is passed on in no worse condition
than that in which it was received, and should also be
entitled to planetary quality comparable to that enjoyed by
previous generations. This is the principle of
“conservation of quality.” Third, each generation should
provide its members with equitable rights of access to the
legacy of past generations and should conserve this access
for future generations. This is the principle of
“conservation of access.”9
Although we will complicate the question of whether “generations”
really mark the most crucial axis of discrimination upon which climate
change acts, we do not aim to undermine the normative thrust of
intergenerational equity as an ideal. In fact, we agree with Jessica Eisen,
Roxanne Mykitiuk, and Dayna Scott who have argued that “if prevailing
modes of governance throughout the global North honoured
[intergenerational equity] principles in practice, [it would represent] a
significant improvement over the current state of affairs.”10 Nonetheless,
also in line with these authors, we are sceptical that “an approach which
treats intra- and inter-generational problems in separate silos will be
capable of grounding the ethical and political orientation” necessary to
9
10

Brown Weiss, In Fairness, supra note 7 at 38.
Jessica Eisen, Roxanne Mykitiuk & Dayna Nadine Scott, “Constituting Bodies into
the Future: Toward a Relational Theory of Intergenerational Justice” (2018) 51:1
UBC L Rev 1 at 22. Furthermore, we agree with Lynda M Collins’s argument that
intergenerational equity must constitute a central feature of the “ecological
constitutions” of the future. Lynda Collins, The Ecological Constitution: Reframing
Environmental Law (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2021).
See also Dayna Nadine Scott, “Review of Lynda M Collins, The Ecological
Constitution,” Ottawa L Rev (forthcoming).
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face the climate crisis.11 Only the third of Brown Weiss’ three principles
addresses “justice between generations and between members of the same
generation.” 12 As such, this conception of intergenerational equity
presents only a limited opening for considering past, present, or future
social conditions of difference, discrimination, and inequality as between
members of the same generation.
Environmental law scholars have long been aware of the shortcomings
in Brown Weiss’s model with respect to the relative under-emphasis on
intra-generational equity. 13 The vast disparities of circumstances,
resources, and interests within a given generation, especially as they
correspond with histories of racism and colonialism, have been a central
focus of the environmental justice movement, but they have not been given
thorough treatment by scholars working under the banner of
intergenerational equity. However, as Lynda Collins maintains, this
critique does not have to be fatal to the larger project, and, here again, we
agree.14 In fact, we see our work as involving the expansion and enriching
of the concept through the explicit incorporation of equity concerns, aided
by critical feminist, relational, and de-colonial approaches.
As Collins notes, the central difficulty is that “characterizing intragenerational equity as a component of intergenerational equity obscures the
real potential for conflict between the present and future.”15 Brown Weiss
does consider, briefly, the possibility of such conflict. In one summary of
her theory, Brown Weiss notes, first, that such conflicts may be illusory
since “poverty is a major cause of ecological degradation” and that “meeting
the basic needs of the poor” is essential to ensuring that “they will have both
the desire and ability to fulfil their intergenerational obligations to conserve
the planet.”16 In cases of true conflict, Brown Weiss remarks only that “we
need to develop appropriate mechanisms and allocate sufficient resources to
maximize the ability to both ‘alleviate poverty as quickly as possible’ and

11
12

13

14
15
16

Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 10 at 22.
Edith Brown Weiss, “Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global
Environmental Change” in Edith Brown Weiss, ed, Environmental Change and
International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions (Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, 1992) 385 [Brown Weiss, “Intergenerational Equity”].
Lynda M Collins, “Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in
Global Environmental Governance” (2007) 30 Dal LJ 79 at 116 [Collins,
“Revisiting the Doctrine”]. See also Catherine Redgwell, Intergenerational
Trusts and Environmental Protection (Manchester: Juris, 1999) at 109, n 208.
Ibid.
Collins, “Revisiting the Doctrine,” supra note 13 at 116.
Brown Weiss, “Intergenerational Equity,” supra note 12 at 398.
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‘protect the health of the planet for future generations.’” 17 Thus, the
mainstream intergenerational equity discourse has not moved beyond
generalized exhortations that “all members of the present generation are
entitled to equitable access to the legacy” of the environment and the
insistence that “intragenerational justice requires wealthier communities to
assist impoverished ones in realizing such access.”18
But the problem runs deeper. The crux of it is this: intergenerational
equity, in the way it is conventionally conceived (and in the way it may be
framed in order to ground a Charter claim), defines generations according to
“rough averages across time,” which obviously glosses over the very
significant disparities in how resources are distributed amongst members of a
generation.19 In operationalizing the concept, one must imagine an aggregate
measure of well-being for each distinct “generation.” The concept of
“sustainable development” in international law, which is strongly influenced
by the idea of obligations to protect the interests of future generations, is
similarly compromised.20 Thus, thinking in terms of generations has the effect
of flattening the obscene disparities of wealth and power—and, thus, the
capacities to both exacerbate and avoid climate crises—that characterize the
collective of people inhabiting the planet at any given moment.
The tendency to define the interests of a generation as an aggregate of
all individual interests is especially problematic in the context of the climate
crisis, against which particularly situated individuals and communities will
have starkly differential abilities to insulate themselves.21 In glossing over
the disparities within generations, the concept thus fails to provide the
analytical tools we need to think about how those disparities may persist
across generations. Will they be exacerbated, mitigated, or erased as they
transfer onto future terrain? Thus, the notion of intergenerational equity,
while elegant and intuitive, is limited by its conjuring of a series of distinct
and monolithic “generations,” with separate, identifiable, and competing
interests. Do people living in one generation have more in common with
their very differently situated contemporaries than they do with their (likely
to have been very similarly situated) ancestors or their (likely to be similarly
situated) descendants?

17
18
19
20
21

Ibid.
Brown Weiss, In Fairness, supra note 7 at 28.
Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 10 at 4.
Ibid.
See Anna Grear, “Towards New Legal Futures? In Search of Renewing Foundations”
in Anna Grear & Evadne Grant, eds, Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age of
Environmental Crisis (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015) 283 at 286.
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A. A Relational Account of Intergenerational Equity:
Intergenerational Environmental Justice
Relational theory emerges from critiques of liberal legalism that show it to
be founded on a fundamentally mistaken understanding of the human person
as an “abstracted, disembodied, rational, universal rights bearing,
contracting, possessive individual.” 22 Relational theorists insist that
everyone’s interests and capacities are “both forged in relation to other
persons, and realized through relations with other persons.”23 These include
interpersonal relationships such as those with family, friends, or co-workers
as well as institutional or structural relationships such as those defined by
gender, class, race, or politics.24 A relational view of the individual, then, is
one in which their interests and capacities, even their obligations, can only
be defined and understood in the context of the entire web of relations.
Indigenous intellectual traditions have long emphasized interconnection
and relationships as central tenets. For example, legal scholar Gordon Christie
describes the individual in Indigenous societies as being conceived as
“interwoven into intricate webs of relationships, the self being defined in its
relation to others.”25 In this world view, individuals are seen as “nodes in these
webs, as relatively fixed and determined beings connected by strands of the
web. The identity of these individuals (and the various communities they
collectively comprise) is provided by the responsibilities they have, which
work to weave the web of which they are parts.” 26 Deborah McGregor’s
22

23

24
25

26

Roxanne Mykitiuk, Legal Texts, Human Bodies: Reading Embodiment in the
Biotech Age (JSD thesis, Columbia Law School, 2003) at 79 [unpublished]. See
also Robert Leckey, Contextual Subjects: Family, State and Relational Theory
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 9.
Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 10 at 26 [emphasis in original], drawing
on Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy,
and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also Jennifer J
Llewellyn & Jocelyn Downie, “Introduction” in Jennifer J Llewellyn & Jocelyn
Downie, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health
Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) 1 at 4.
Nedelsky, supra note 23 at 4.
Gordon Christie, “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” (2003) 2:1 Indigenous LJ
67 at 109. Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott point out some the crucial differences between
these various relational accounts, noting that Christie describes “persons as ‘nodes’
or ‘fixed and determined beings’ rather than (as relational theorists would have it)
as continuously constituted and reconstituted by their relationships … and in
describing persons as bound by things which they “must” do, as opposed to the
relational conception of rights and responsibilities as being open to constant social
contestation and redefinition.” Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 10 at 27, n 99.
Christie, supra note 25 [emphasis in original].
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scholarship on Anishinaabek law has also demonstrated a reciprocity to these
relationships. Just as waters, understood as sentient beings, must “fulfil their
responsibilities around giving and supporting life,” so will people, specifically
Anishinaabe kwe (women) have obligations to protect those waters.27
Relational theory provokes a similar challenge to the notion of the
identifiable, separable, and undifferentiated “generations” of orthodox
accounts of intergenerational equity. The circumstances and choices of
people in previous generations manifest in the relational construction of
today’s problems, as well as tomorrow’s problems, for which there is no
better example than climate change, as Sara Seck has aptly demonstrated.28
But, as we reject conceptions of discrete “generations” that have a separate
set of interests from those that come before and after them, so we also must
recognize the responsibilities that flow across those boundaries. As Angela
Harris argues, “humans are dependent not only on one another but on a
series of trans-human systems.”29 On this account, states take on obligations
to maintain ecological systems and processes necessary for human survival,
as in the conventional conception of intergenerational equity, but without
the need to construct the generations as separate and identifiable.
On this point as well, Indigenous legal traditions have long exposed
the inadequacy of Western notions of intergenerational justice. As
McGregor explains, current generations will be called on to “enact
obligations to ensure that future generations would know the waters as
healthy living entities.”30 In her legal order, as well as in a variety of other
distinct Indigenous legal orders, McGregor emphasizes that, in addition to
existing within the web of all living beings, reciprocal relationships exist
between ancestors and descendants.31 For example, in her Hul’quimi’num
legal tradition, legal scholar Sarah Morales explains that “places become
the ancestors; they serve as ‘living’ legal scholars.” 32 WSÁNEĆ legal
27

28

29

30
31

32

Deborah McGregor, “Indigenous Women, Water Justice and Zaagidowin
(Love)” (2015) 30:2–3 Can Woman Studies / Cahiers femme 71 at 73.
Sara L Seck, “Relational Law and the Reimagining of Tools for Environmental
and Climate Justice” (2019) 31:1 CJWL 151.
Angela P Harris, “Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene”
(2014) 6:1 Washington & Lee J Energy, Climate & Environment 98 at 126.
McGregor, supra note 27 at 74.
Deborah McGregor, “Indigenous Environmental Justice: Towards an Ethical
and Sustainable Future” in Brendan Hokowhitu et al, eds, Routledge Handbook
of Critical Indigenous Studies (London: Routledge, 2020) 405 at 413.
Sarah Morales, Snuw’uyulh: Fostering an Understanding of the Hul'qumi'num Legal
Tradition (PhD dissertation, Facultyof Law, University of Victoria, 2014)at 144, online
(pdf): UVicSpace <hdl.handle.net/1828/6106> [https://perma.cc/TU47-ZGY3].
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scholar Rob Clifford describes the belief that ancestors become islands in
the territory, creating—in the present—obligations to care for places; those
places represent both gift and obligation. 33 As Christine J. Winter says, the
“focus is on the survival and continuity of the community, linking from
past to present into the future.”34
All of this leads us to question whether the interests of those in
different generations are actually competing in a meaningful way. Are
today’s and future generations really rivals? Or is it the case that people
living today are invested for their own sake in a livable future for their
descendants? Is there a more collective or generalizable social interest in
the well-being of future generations beyond thinking of our own
descendants? These tensions emerge as we turn to trying to capture the
essence of climate injustice in available grounds under the Charter.
B. Capturing Climate Injustice in Charter Grounds
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a celebrated instrument
of human rights law in Canada, credited with completely changing the
legal landscape upon its entrenchment in the Constitution in 1982.35 The
Charter’s “equality guarantee” was a centrepiece of the Charter’s
promise, but has largely failed to live up to expectations.36 It recognizes
various grounds of discrimination as “enumerated” in section 15(1), thus
explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, national or
33

34

35

36

Robert YEL ḰÁTTE Clifford, “WSÁNEĆ Legal Theory and the Fuel Spill at
SELEK̵TEL̵ (Goldstream River)” (2016) 61:4 McGill LJ 755, online: <doi.org/
10.7202/1038488ar> [https://perma.cc/URC8-79BP].
Christine J Winter, Subjects of Intergenerational Environmental Justice:
Indigenous Philosophy, the Environment and Relationships (London: Routledge,
2022) at 16 [Winter, Intergenerational Environmental Justice].
Charter, supra note 2; Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers,
“Introduction” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds,
The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017) 1 at 5–7.
Sonia Lawrence, “Equality and Anti-Discrimination: The Relationship between
Government Goals and Finding Discrimination in Section 15” in Oliver, Macklem
& Des Rosiers, supra note 35, 815 at 817, 839–40; Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette
Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of the Charter”
(2013) 64 UNBLJ 19; Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C Faria & Emily Lawrence, “What’s
Law Good For?: An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions”
(2004) 24 SCLR 103 at 112–18. See also Dayna Nadine Scott, “Environmental
Justice and the Hesitant Embrace of Rights” in James R May & Erin Daly, Human
Rights and the Environment: Indivisibility, Dignity, and Legality, Encyclopedia of
Environmental Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar and the IUCN Academy of
Environmental Law, 2019) 447.

ISSUE 1. VOL. 17

JOURNAL OF LAW & EQUALITY

175

ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, and mental or physical
disability.” 37 The jurisprudence has also recognized various grounds as
“analogous” to these express grounds, including citizenship, marital status,
sexual orientation, and off -reserve Aboriginal status, and certain
“embedded” or “intersectional”38 grounds of discrimination as analogous
for the purposes of section 15(1).
Several youth-led climate lawsuits have now been filed in Canada,
stretching back about two years, and most are still making their slow journey
through the court system. While the specific arguments, targets, and tactics
of the claims are distinct, most of the claims rely on section 15’s equality
guarantee. A “common thread,” according to Chalifour, Earle, and
Macintyre is the fact that “[t]he ‘present bias’ of public climate policies has
depleted, and continues to deplete, Canada’s carbon budget for the twentyfirst century, and there is irrefutable scientific evidence that, as a result,
youth and future generations will bear a disproportionate burden of a
destabilized climate simply by being born later in time.”39 The core of the
argument advanced in the youth climate litigation, then, is that “an
inadequate or slow response by governments violates the equality rights of
both youth and future generations.”40 Decisions taken by governments today
continue to allow and enable greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to rise at a
rate that is causing irreversible warming. As the authors correctly note,
[t]his warming creates a cascade of serious social,
economic, and health consequences of both a physical and
mental nature. These consequences are (and will continue
to be) disproportionately borne by younger and future
generations, both because of the length of time they will
live their lives on an impacted planet and, in the case of
children, because of their unique vulnerabilities to some
of the impacts.41
Turning to the equality rights guarantee, then, is understandable.
Section 15(1) of the Charter states that “[e]very individual is equal before
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
37
38

39
40
41

Lawrence, supra note 36 at 817–18; Charter, supra note 2.
Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality)
Baselines” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 637 at 644.
Chalifour, Earle & Macintyre, supra note 3 at 1.
Ibid.
Ibid at 4.
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benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre
argue that children’s rights can be conceived of as individual rights within
the present generation—for which the enumerated ground of age is
adequate. The authors reason that children’s disadvantage, which stems in
part from their “lack of independence and capacity for decision-making,”
means that they rely almost entirely on the goodwill of others. The authors
say that this fact makes them vulnerable “as a group” in a way that engages
the Charter according to the jurisprudence.42 It gives them a “pre-existing
disadvantage” in society, meaning (in the equality jurisprudence) that the
state cannot now come along and treat them in a way that unfairly
exacerbates that disadvantage.
As Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre acknowledge, however, a claim
under the enumerated ground of age can provide protection for present
generations of young people, but not necessarily for generations to come.
The authors acknowledge that it is unclear “whether Canadian courts will
consider future generations to be part of the enumerated ground of age
given that such claimants do not yet exist (and are therefore not currently
experiencing discrimination).” 43 In our analysis, whether or not law’s
“boxes” created under the Charter jurisprudence can neatly accommodate
the claims of those harmed and expected to be harmed by climate change
is somewhat beside the point. If we cannot remedy these harms and
prevent expected harms with the current set of conceptual tools or
categories, then we will need new categories.
As far as categories go, “class” would be a good one to consider in this
context. Debate about class as an analogous ground under the Charter has
not been part of mainstream Charter discourse for some time.44 However,
42
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it is increasingly recognized that the climate crisis is “at its core a class
struggle.”45 This is not only about major divergences in consumption; it is
also about blame and responsibility. 46 An Oxfam report in 2015 found
“extreme carbon inequality,” demonstrating that the richest 10 percent of
people in the world were responsible for 50 percent of emissions, while
the poorest 50 percent are responsible for only 10 percent.47 Similarly, the
impacts of climate change fall disproportionately on the poor and
marginalized. This trend is likely to intensify in the future.48
If current trajectories continue, all indications are that the most likely
political future (without broad-based mass mobilization) is a concentrated
liberal legalism in which the most privileged among us build, for themselves,
a “ship” to survive the coming storm.49 Dubbed a “climate leviathan” by Joel
Wainwright and Geoff Mann, this trajectory sees the virtual abandonment of
carbon mitigation efforts in favour of adaptation projects that allow the most
advantaged “to stabilize their position amidst planetary crises.”50 According
to the authors, the need to act in this way will be deemed “an exception”
proclaimed in the name of preserving life on Earth.
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“Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice: Ecological and Relational Tipping
Points” (2020) 11:1 WIREs Climate Change 1.
Joel Wainwright & Geoff Mann, Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our
Planetary Future (London: Verso Books, 2020) at 15.
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The fight against climate change, which is already exacerbating existing
disparities between people living on the planet now, is one in which
meaningful responses require sacrifice. Who will make these sacrifices? The
youth climate litigation is about demanding that current generations take on
some of that burden by acting now to ease their suffering later. Further, the
capacity of the wealthy, who benefit disproportionately from economic
growth, to work against the conversion of our economies towards less
carbon intensive alternatives is much greater than the capacities of the poor
to work towards achieving it. This is a structural problem of the kind that
liberal rights-based approaches have proven exceptionally inept at
resolving. In this sense, the failure of our courts to date to find a Charter
violation for these youth claimants holds much more weight than a claim
based on simple age discrimination can bear. With this in mind, we advance
the argument that not only is a collective claim on behalf of future
generations the best fit for the actual justice problem that inheres in the
climate crisis, but a relational account of intergenerational justice also
provides a robust foundation for such a claim.
C. “The Future” Is Collective
Discrimination, as Joshua Sealy-Harrington says, “is a fluid mischief
predicated on social context and hierarchy.”51 Future generations will come
into being within increasingly disrupted socio-ecological systems: the
latency effects of GHGs mean that decades of warming are already “locked
in” and cannot be reversed. 52 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) released their sixth working group report in 2021, stating
that action is urgently needed: if human societies fail to enact dramatic
interventions in the coming decades, the earth system may cross what they
term an “ecological tipping point” somewhere around the point of a two
degrees Celsius increase in global average temperature. 53 Crossing this
threshold will usher in a dangerous new world marked by extreme weather,
51
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/09/22/climate/climate-change-future.html> [https://perma.cc/BXP3-DVR7].
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severe drought, drastic sea-level rise, unpredictable precipitation patterns,
ocean acidification, and more.
In this section, we build on Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre’s proposal
that courts interpreting section 15 of the Charter could establish a
“generational instantiation of age,” which would be novel and would require
the courts to establish future generations as “an analogous ground closely
linked to age.”54 In support of that proposal, and on the basis of the relational
account of intergenerational equity that we term “intergenerational
environmental justice,” we make the argument that a conception of future
generations as an analogous ground does not require that the interests of that
“generation” are somehow completely separate and identifiable from others,
nor does it require that the interests of those future generations be rival to the
interests of those in the present generation. 55 Instead, not only are people
living today invested for their own sake in a liveable future for others, but the
act of defending the rights of future generations can improve environmental
conditions today. In other words, there is an underlying reciprocity between
present and future generations sufficient to create obligations. Further, if we
interrogate the deeper assumptions about the nature of “time” that underpin
orthodox accounts of intergenerational justice, drawing again on Indigenous
intellectual traditions, we gain additional support for finding the necessary
reciprocity between generations.
To begin, we reference Richard Hiskes’s framing of environmental
human rights as “emergent rights.”56 Environmental human rights have long
been considered as group rights, despite long-standing objections from some
philosophers who insist that rights can only attach to individuals. In Hiskes’s
conception, environmental human rights are “rights that we hold only because
of our relationships with others that cause collective effects on our shared
environment. That is, they are rights due us—not because of something in our
individual nature—but because of the effects of our relationships with others.
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If those relationships did not exist, neither would the rights.”57 In other words,
environmental human rights are “emergent” in the sense that they are the
“product of distinctly modern human interrelations and interactions with the
environment.” 58 We agree with Hiskes when he notes that conceiving of
human rights as “the property of privately defined individuality is a logical
incongruity,” and we would add that it is not compatible with feminist,
relational, and de-colonial theory. Environmental human rights are emergent
“because the human identity to which they attach is itself emergent from every
individual’s relations with others.”59
But can future generations hold environmental rights? Western
philosophers have contested the idea that we could hold responsibilities to future
generations analogous to the responsibilities we owe to fellow persons. They
argue that there are moral, epistemological, and ontological considerations in
thinking about future persons that are distinct from the considerations we have
in thinking about our contemporaries. The widely discussed complications in
thinking about future persons include their contingent existence, the
unknowability that surrounds their conditions and identity, and the lack of
reciprocity—traditionally deemed a condition for justice—in their relation to
present individuals.60 As Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin say, “individuals
are in reciprocal relationship with their contemporaries, but with their
contemporaries only.”61 But Hiskes makes the counter-point:
The rights of future generations to a safe environment
necessarily also strengthens the same rights for the living,
because the health of the environment inherited by our
successors depends upon actions taken by the living
respecting the same rights that they hold. That is,
defending the rights of the future makes the case for
present rights even stronger by necessitating that action
be taken now to enhance those rights; such action will also
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obviously enhance the environmental rights of present
generations as well.62
A simple example demonstrating the relationship between GHG emissions
and local, ground-level pollution should suffice. Coal-fired power plants emit
high amounts of carbon dioxide emissions and are thus often marked as easy
targets by governments seeking to take concrete climate action.63 But coal-fired
power plants also emit pollutants such as particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and
nitrogen dioxide that are major contributors to premature death and childhood
asthma. 64 Therefore, an action taken to reduce GHG emissions causing
climate—perhaps motivated politically by a concern for future generations—
produces major health benefits to specifically situated people living today.
The idea that the interests of present and future generations are
interacting in a way that enhances them both is appealing to feminists and
also has resonance with de-colonial theory. As Dene political theorist Glen
Coulthard explains, the Dene conception of identity locates individuals
as an inseparable part of an expansive system of
interdependent relations covering the land and animals,
past and future generations, as well as other people and
communities. This self-conception demands that we
conduct ourselves in accordance with certain ethicopolitical norms, which stresses, among other things, the
importance of sharing, egalitarianism, respecting the
freedom and autonomy of both individuals and groups,
and recognizing the obligations that one has not only to
other people, but to the natural world as a whole.65
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Similarly, Makere Stewart-Harawira says its “impossible to conceive of the
present and future as separate and distinct from the past,” saying each is
constitutive of the others. 66 Time, in Indigenous conceptions, does not
“charge on a linear path into the future.” 67 It is this notion that prompts
Christine J. Winter to ask: “[W]hat happens to our imaginings of
intergenerational environmental justice if we think of generations living not
in competitive sequences, but synchronically”? 68 She paints a picture of
ancestors, the living and future generations as all integral to a “recurrent
spiral of time and being-in-place.” 69 Once freed of the notion of a linear
continuum with each generation marked by a singular point, it is obvious that
the generations need not be constructed as rival. The actions we take when
we conceive of ourselves as both ancestors and descendants, make us better
ancestors and improve the living conditions of people living today—ideally,
those most vulnerable to adverse climate impacts.

D. Adverse Treatment and the “Carbon Budget”
Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre conduct a systematic review of the factors
that courts consider in a section 15 analysis, and we do not repeat that
review here. Particularly salient for this commentary is the fact that a
crucial factor is whether the relevant group lacks “effective legal and
political power.” As the authors explain, “governments are making
decisions today that privilege current generations and foist the difficult,
costly decisions (and harms) to a later time. This runs counter to young
people’s best interests, reinforcing the view that children and youth are
less worthy of political consideration than their older counterparts.”70 This
pattern of short-termism in a political system in which young people do
not vote or exercise other levers of power is well entrenched and an
obvious contributor to intergenerational inequities.
The idea of a finite amount of atmospheric “space” conjured by the
concept of a “carbon budget,” as demonstrated by Chalifour, Earle, and
Macintyre, is one way that advocates have tried to drive home the point that
young people and future generations suffer discrimination in relation to the
climate crisis. The governments’ irresponsible depletion of Canada’s finite
carbon budget for the twenty-first century favours current generations to the
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detriment of people who will live longer into the future. As the authors state,
“[d]espite accepting incontrovertible evidence that youth and future
generations will face extensive harm if GHG emissions are not rapidly
reduced, governments continue to deplete their carbon budgets at an
unsustainable pace, thereby prioritizing short-term objectives over what the
evidence suggests are much more pressing long-term needs.” 71 But the
concept of a carbon budget tends to fuel the idea of a “zero-sum tug of war
between the generations.”72 While helpful in the litigation context because
it offers an evidence-based, concrete way of demonstrating discrimination,
critics have pointed out that the “view of fundamentally conflicting interests
is profoundly unhelpful and damaging and could promote bitter legacies of
social division.” 73 In fact, it may further the notion of a “competitive
sequence” of generations that does not adequately capture the mutuality of
interests; it emphasizes entitlements rather than obligations to steward.
We agree with Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre that courts will “need to
be willing to engage in a flexible, context-based inquiry in applying section
15(1) to the circumstances of climate change and the novel issues that these
actions present in claims by youth.”74 These unique circumstances include
the way that class, race/Indigeneity, and youth intersect to compound and
exacerbate vulnerabilities to climate change. Commentators argue that the
Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Fraser v Canada provides a
more flexible and generous approach to interpreting the existing grounds of
discrimination. 75 In this case, the Court opted to adjudicate the equality
claim on the existing ground of “sex” rather than considering whether to
recognize parental or “family status” as an analogous ground. According to
Justice Rosalie Abella, a “robust and intersectional analysis of gender and
parenting” could be carried out under the existing enumerated ground of
sex.76 Similarly, as Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre suggest, a robust and
intersectional analysis of youth and future generations could be undertaken
under the enumerated ground of age or with “youth” and “future
generations” recognized as analogous grounds embedded within the
enumerated ground of age.77 A relational account of intergenerational equity
71
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aids in this analysis, emphasizing that we should identify discrimination
here even if the interests of various generations are not completely
identifiable or separate from others and even if the interests of those future
generations are not truly “rival” to the interests of those of us living now.
To conclude this section, we agree that “substantive equality in the
context of intergenerational climate rights requires that the judiciary find
a way to bridge the temporal divide in order to better align present actions
with just outcomes in the future.” 78 We further agree that “substantive
equality” within and between generations is the end goal. To reach it, we
need to also consider the processes by which we can acknowledge and
overcome the barriers that have produced the inequalities in the first place.
In this context, however, it is worth noting that environmental human
rights are widely considered to be part of a human rights canon developed
in the global North in an ostensibly universal, but decidedly Eurocentric,
mode. As Carmen Gonzalez says, “[t]his canon favours civil and political
rights over economic, social, and cultural rights … [and] elevates
individual rights over collective rights.” 79 And while we agree with
Gonzalez that “it is necessary to expose the Northern biases of the human
rights corpus,” we also point out that, with respect to climate justice claims
as human rights claims, the calculus is perhaps unique.80 In the usual case,
it is common to point out that human rights discourses favour
the rights of specific individuals and communities on a
case-by-case basis rather than challenging paradigms of
economic development that impose disproportionate
burdens on the planet’s most vulnerable communities.
The case-by-case approach can implicitly legitimate the
existing distributions of wealth and power by dealing with
environmental injustice as aberrant rather than
recognizing it as systemic. Tinkering with the discrete
manifestations of injustice may divert attention from
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efforts to challenge a failed development model based on
the myth of unlimited economic growth and
externalization of environmental and social costs.81
But, in the climate justice context, human rights claims brought by
relatively privileged youth of the global North, such as Canada, could
produce gains that help to protect the climate for everyone. These claims,
if successful, further the rights of young people elsewhere and future
generations of people everywhere. In other words, the youth litigants
recognize that their interests are not rival to those of future generations but
synchronous with them.
E. Good Ancestors
In the early summer of 2021, Twitter was flooded with a generationbridging meme from The Simpsons as a deadly, record-breaking heat wave
blanketed western Canada: when Bart complains that “[t]his is the hottest
summer of his life,” Homer retorts that “[t]his is the coldest summer of the
rest of your life.” 82 The reality confronting young people today—of
inevitable, yet unknowable, disruption of massive magnitude—forces us
to see how “our” world will not be “their” world. In a recent collection of
essays asking “[w]hat kind of ancestor do you want to be?” the editors
argue that confronting this question
deepens our awareness of the roots and reach of all of our
actions and non-actions. In every moment, whether we
like it or not, and whether we know it or not, we are
advancing values and influencing systems that will
continue long past our lifetimes. These values and
systems shape communities and lives we will never see.
The ways we live create and reinforce the foundation of
life for future generations.83
The young people coming to the courts now in the wave of litigation
swelling across Canada and internationally under the banner of youth
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climate justice or intergenerational climate justice are asking similar
questions. They want to know: can their political leaders be expected to
respond consciously and with integrity to the responsibility of creating a
good foundation for their future lives and those of others to come? This
can be framed in terms of the “rights” of those young people and future
generations, or it can be framed as the “responsibilities” of all of us living
now. “Good ancestors,” as Cate Sandilands says, “thoughtfully cherish and
nurture the world and the liveliness of others as best we are able.” 84
Crucially, a good ancestor recognizes that our “gifts in the present may
resonate in new ways in the future.”85 And, conversely, we suppose, our
oversights, our haste, our indulgences, our short-sightedness may all
resonate in new and different ways in the future too.
We argue for a focus on root structural change, and this focus implies
a prescriptive vision intimately concerned with the interests of all future
persons. It demands an integrated, rigorous account of the intersecting set
of factors that are making young people and future generations subject to,
and vulnerable to, adverse climate impacts. Of course, this task involves a
“more focussed and deliberate reckoning with the puzzles of
intergenerational justice” than a Charter claim can accomplish. 86 To
conclude this part, we suggest that a relational account of intergenerational
equity—which we term intergenerational environmental justice—provides
a solid foundation for a robust intersectional analysis that can ground a
Charter claim on behalf of youth and future generations. In terms of both
preventive action and remedial action, however, we need to look beyond
the Charter and, indeed, beyond litigation. In the next part, we consider
some innovative examples of institutional, legislative, and deliberative
mechanisms that seek to systematically embed the consideration of future
interests in environmental governance.
III. BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: IMPLEMENTING A PRACTICE OF
INTERGENERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A constitution without an ecological consciousness, Lynda Collins writes,
“is a paper temple—an aspirational blueprint for political community with
no real guarantee of its survival over time.” 87 Designed to guide
government conduct beyond electoral mandates, constitutions intuitively
seem to be well-suited instruments to enshrine principles of ecological
84
85
86
87

Sandilands, supra note 5 at 185.
Ibid at 179.
Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 10 at 28.
Lynda Collins, The Ecological Constitution: Reframing Environmental Law
(Oxford: Routledge, 2021) at 118.

ISSUE 1. VOL. 17

JOURNAL OF LAW & EQUALITY

187

sustainability and intergenerational equity. Yet many legal scholars and
political theorists have highlighted the limitations of constitutionalism
alone to effectively improve states’ environmental record. When it comes
to protecting future generations, Jonathan Boston and Thomas Stuart
observe that most existing constitutional provisions are aspirational and
vague, thus providing little guidance for judges and little incentive for
policy-makers to secure long-term environmental equity.88 In this part, we
broaden the scope of our commentary and take up Chalifour, Earle, and
Macintyre’s call to examine “what taking future generations into account
means in practice.”89 If Canadian courts were to rule in favour of youth
claimants in Mathur v Ontario, and to extend constitutional protection to
future generations, how could the executive adequately secure for them
the “equal benefit of the law” guaranteed under section 15(1) of the
Charter?90 In other words, what devices, beyond constitutional provisions,
can be envisioned to effectively prevent and redress future generations’
environmental disadvantage?
Building on recent research and policy developments, we explore a
selection of institutional, legislative, and deliberative mechanisms that have
sought to uphold long-term interests in environmental decision-making.
Drawn from Wales, Finland, and Japan, the chosen case studies are not
intended to provide an exhaustive account of the international efforts to
further intergenerational sustainability or to be straightforwardly transposed
to the Canadian context. Rather, we hope that they might offer situated and
inspirational examples and stimulate further research on adequate policy
developments in Canada. In line with relational theory scholars, and with
adrienne maree-brown’s opening epigraph, we maintain that working
towards intergenerational environmental justice requires paying attention
not only to the relations between individuals within and across generations
but also between communities and their governance institutions. Hence, we
start with a reflection on the role that institutional guardians for future
generations can play in protecting long-term environmental interests before
turning to the prospects offered by future-oriented legislative reforms and
by public participation in environmental governance processes.
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A. Governing for the Long Term: Institutional Guardianship for
Future Generations
As previously observed, political short-termism has been a key contributor
to intergenerational inequities in Western democratic systems. In the
introduction to their book Institutions for Future Generations, Iñigo
González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries identify three determinants of shorttermism: epistemic, motivational, and institutional. 91 While epistemic
determinants stem from citizens’ and politicians’ uncertainty about the
future, motivational determinants concern the alleged preference of the
former for the satisfaction of short-term needs and the tendency of the
latter to seek re-election; underlying these trends, institutional
determinants refer to the lack of institutional capacity to pursue and
achieve long-term objectives.92 Since the 1990s, one of the most widely
discussed propositions to offset political presentism has been the creation
of a public body tasked with defending future interests—with scenarios
ranging from the appointment of an individual guardian for future
generations to multi-member national institutions and the nomination of a
United Nations ombudsperson.93
Several countries have since experimented with guardianship
institutions, most of which did not last more than a few years. For instance,
in Israel, a parliamentary Commission for Future Generations was active
from 2001 to 2006 and soon dissolved after members of parliament raised
concerns about its operating cost and its authority to interfere in their
work.94 In Hungary, an independent commissioner for future generations
was elected in 2008 by Parliament, with the mandate to enforce the right
to a healthy environment that was at the time enshrined in the country’s
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Constitution. 95 The commissioner’s position was abrogated in 2012,
following the victory of the right-wing populist party Fidesz. A few
institutional innovations conducted in other countries were more
successful, and, in the following sections, we outline the role that futureoriented commissions have played in Finland and Wales.
1. Finland’s Committee for the Future
Established in 1993 in the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta), the Committee
for the Future is the longest-lived institution of its kind. Composed of
seventeen members of parliament appointed for four years and supported
by four staff members, the committee is tasked to “generate dialogue with
the government on major future problems and opportunities.” 96 By
contrast with other standing committees within the Eduskunta, the
Committee for the Future operates mostly outside of the ordinary
parliamentary process, as a think tank with no legislative role. Its primary
function is to prepare the Eduskunta’s response to the government’s
Future Report, a document issued halfway through each electoral term that
focuses on a topic with significant future implications. Past themes of the
Future Reports published so far include Finland’s place and role in the
world, a carbon neutral future, sustainable growth, and the future of work.
After receiving the report, the Committee for the Future consults
relevant experts and helps orient its objectives and the government’s agenda
through a dialogue with the Prime Minister’s Office.97 Once approved by
the Parliament, the committee’s response is turned into instructions on what
the Eduskunta wants the government to focus on. These resolutions stay in
force until the committee revokes them, which are often past electoral terms,
thus providing “a tool for genuine intertemporal policy-making.” 98 In
addition to its work on the Future Reports, the committee plays an advisory
role to analyze future trends, develop future-oriented methodologies, and
assess technological developments and their societal consequences. Since
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2017, it has also served as a correspondent for the government’s Agenda
2030 report on sustainable development.
Due to its “outsider status” within Parliament, the Committee for the
Future enjoys a high degree of independence but has limited policy
impacts.99 The advisory nature of its work makes it difficult to quantify its
influence on parliamentary processes and governmental decisions.
However, recent interviews conducted with current and former members
of the committee have suggested that, although the institution lacks
traditional political influence, the knowledge and visionary outputs it
generates have contributed to instil a culture of forward thinking among
decisions-makers and to orient legislation and government programs.100
Interestingly, four out of the six Finnish prime ministers appointed
between 2000 and 2019 were former members of the committee,
illustrating its capacity to train future leaders.101
In contrast with the limited power of the Finnish Committee for the
Future—which may contribute to explain its longevity—the second
institution we are turning to is endowed with a stronger prescriptive role
and has so far survived six years of activity.
2. Wales’s Future Generations Commissioner
A relatively small jurisdiction in the United Kingdom, Wales, in the words
of former Minister for Environment Jane Davidson, shows greater
innovative capacity than its larger neighbours. 102 With two devolution
referendums in 1997 and 2011 and the establishment of a National
Assembly in 1998 and of an independent government in 2006, the country
has progressively gained considerable autonomy from Westminster.103 To
date, it exercises devolved power over twenty subject areas including
education, economic development, the environment, agriculture, and
health. Marked by a long industrial history and poor health records, Wales
was however the first Western nation to explicitly include a duty to
promote sustainable development in its founding piece of legislation, the
Government of Wales Act 1998.104
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After nearly two decades of efforts to consolidate environmental
policies while the country was gaining greater law-making powers, the
Welsh government appointed in 2006 its first future generations
commissioner, a position since held by Sophie Howe. Unlike Finland’s
Committee for the Future, the office of the future generations
commissioner for Wales is independent from both Parliament and the
government. Instead of a multi-member commission, Wales opted for a
seven-year individual appointment, although the work of the
commissioner is supported by a team of twenty-two employees and an
Advisory Panel of seven members chosen by the ministers. 105
The role of the Welsh commissioner has been established by the Wellbeing of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, an innovative piece of
legislation further discussed in the next section of our commentary.106 The
commissioner’s general duty as described in the Act is to “promote the
sustainable development principle, in particular to act as a guardian of the
ability of future generations to meet their needs.”107 Her mandate is closely
tied to the delivery of the Act and involves a sustained collaboration with
all of the country’s public bodies to encourage them to account for the
long-term impacts of their action. 108 More specifically, her oversight
capacity includes: conducting reviews on the extent to which a public body
is safeguarding the ability of future generations to meet their needs;
providing assistance to public bodies in the achievement of the well-being
objectives that they are required to set under the Act; undertaking
research—in particular, on the extent to which the sustainable
development principle is accounted for in national indicators; and making
recommendations to ministers about national well-being goals and
indicators. 109 The commissioner is also expected to publish a
comprehensive Future Generations report, the first of which was released
in 2020. Over a whopping eight hundred pages, the report covers the work
Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, “Our Team” (2021), online:
Comisiyndd Cenedlaethau’r Dyfodol Cymru <www.futuregenerations.wales/aboutus/our-team/> [https://perma.cc/5CUJ-BFQZ]. Current to 10 August 2021.
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performed by the commissioner to deliver on her mandate, the progress
made since 2016 by public bodies to meet their well-being objectives, and
future areas of focus and improvement for the years to come.110
The two institutional models provided by the Finnish Committee for
the Future and the Welsh future generations commissioner both tackle,
through different methods, the determinants of political short-termism.
While the former relies on soft power and anticipatory thinking to emulate
foresight among members of parliament and ministers, the latter has
actionable legal powers that apply to a broader range of institutions and
stakeholders. By contrast with the advisory role traditionally assigned to
ombudspersons,111 the Well-being of Future Generations Act indeed gives
a binding character to the recommendations made by the Welsh
commissioner to the government and all other public bodies.112
In 2016, the Canadian Standing Committee on Environment and
Sustainable Development published a report reviewing the Federal
Sustainable Development Act.113 Among the strategies outlined to address
the flaws of the Act, the committee recommended that the federal
government recognize intergenerational justice as an integral part of
sustainable development and appoint an “advocate for Canada’s future
generations.”114 This call remains unheeded. The shared jurisdiction of the
federal and provincial governments over environmental matters in Canada
represents a significant hindrance in the elaboration of a harmonized
institutional framework supporting intergenerational environmental
justice. Yet it can be argued that this jurisdictional challenge equally
evidences the need for a future-oriented institution to guide environmental
decision-making across the country. As mobilization on the ground and in
Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, “The Future Generations Report
2020: At a Glance” (2020), online (pdf): Comisiyndd Cenedlaethau’r Dyfodol
Cymru <www.futuregenerations.wales/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/At-A-GlanceFG-Report.pdf#page=3> [https://perma.cc/QP93-3KPE].
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the courts continues to implore Canadian governments to face responsibly
the unfolding ecological crisis, the visionary institutions established in
Finland and Wales represent important experiences to learn from, as does
the pioneering legal path taken in Wales since 2016.
B. Inscribing the Rights and Well-being of Future Generations into Law
As mentioned before, most of the future-oriented institutions established
so far have lacked capacity to effectively inform governmental decisions.
Wales has overcome this pitfall by passing a law that entrenches long-term
well-being objectives at all levels of government action, making it the
“only country to legislate for the needs of future generations.” 115 Jane
Davidson, one of the architects of the Well-being of Future Generations
Act, recounts in a recent book the elaboration of this groundbreaking
legislation.116 In line with the provisions detailed in the Government of
Wales Act 1998, several schemes were developed between 1999 and 2011
to promote sustainable development in the exercise of the newly
established National Assembly of Wales. Yet, as Davidson notes, the
regulatory approach prevailing in these schemes was insufficient; the
government “needed to turn the law from a duty to ‘promote’ to a duty to
‘deliver’.”117 It was decided to draft a law making sustainable development
and the well-being of future generations into the central organizing
principle of public sector organizations and of the government itself.
Davidson points out that laws are “explicitly created to live longer than the
governments that create them,” thus giving them the potential to operate
as intergenerational instruments.118 After three years of consultation and
negotiation, the National Assembly of Wales eventually passed the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act in April 2015.
The Act builds on two main concepts. First, it translates the
Brundtland report’s definition of sustainable development into law,
ordering public bodies to act “in a manner which seeks to ensure that the
needs of the present are met without compromising the ability of future
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2018) at 13, online (pdf): Comisiyndd Cenedlaethau’r Dyfodol Cymru
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generations to meet their own needs.”119 The Act, however, expands the
traditional understanding of sustainable development beyond
environmental concerns by linking it to the broader notion of “well-being.”
It highlights four dimensions of well-being: economic, social,
environmental, and cultural—the latter being a first in the international
legislative landscape. 120 Concretely speaking, the law outlines seven
national well-being goals (a prosperous Wales, a resilient Wales, a
healthier Wales, a more equal Wales, a Wales of cohesive communities, a
Wales of vibrant culture and thriving Welsh language, and a globally
responsible Wales) and requires each public body to set and publish their
own well-being objectives in line with these national guidelines.121 While
doing so, public bodies are expected to take an “integrated approach” to
anticipate how their well-being objectives may impact each other or
interfere with the objectives of other public bodies. 122 They must also
publish an annual report of the progress they have made towards meeting
these well-being objectives.
In addition, the Act includes provisions specific to governmental
planning. Among them, Welsh ministers are required to publish during the
first year following a general election a “future trends report” to anticipate
potential developments in the economic, social, environmental, and
cultural well-being of Wales.123 This report must take into account the
predicted impacts of climate change as communicated by the UK
government as well as the actions taken by the United Nations in relation
to the Sustainable Development Goals. As briefly mentioned earlier, the
Well-being of Future Generations Act also orders Welsh ministers to
publish before the Parliament, and after consulting the future generations
commissioner, a set of national indicators and milestones allowing the
measurement of progress towards the achievement of the well-being
goals. 124 These indicators and milestones must be accounted for in the
annual well-being reports published by each minister.
The wide-ranging accountability mechanisms featured in the Act reflect
law-makers’ intention to make it into an actionable tool to durably transform
119
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political cultures and governance practices. As Jonathan Boston observes,
governing for the long-term indeed requires building future-oriented
objectives into the very core of institutions. Boston writes that the future
“must be brought more comprehensively, systematically, and continuously
into the heart of decision-making.” 125 By contrast with constitutional
provisions that generally frame the protection of future generations as a
negative right (not to be discriminated against), the legal approach taken by
Wales has created a positive obligation to prioritize environmental and
social sustainability at all levels of governmental action. Although it is too
early to assess the long-term outcomes of this legal innovation, the Welsh
Act is already seen as a model to tackle political short-termism. Walking in
the footsteps of its neighbour, the UK Parliament is currently reviewing a
private member’s bill for the well-being of future generations, which has
garnered broad public support. 126 An increasing number of countries,
including New Zealand and Italy, are considering taking similar paths.127
Further research initiatives would be welcome to explore the possibility of
crafting and implementing such a law in Canada.
C. Cultivating Intergenerational Solidarity through Public Participation
The institutional and legal reforms we have examined so far have essentially
addressed the determinants of short-termism at the level of policy-makers.
However, governing for the long term not only requires a shift in political
stakeholders’ culture and priorities but also the external drivers that inform
their decisions, such as public opinions and preferences. 128 In this last
section, we turn our attention to the procedural dimension of
Jonathan Boston, “Assessing the Options for Combatting Democratic Myopia
and Safeguarding Long-Term Interests” (2021) 125 Futures 1 at 11.
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intergenerational justice: what role might the public play in the development
of future-oriented governance models and whose knowledge and needs
should be accounted for as we plan for the generations to come?
As Chalifour, Earle, and Macintyre have noted, one of the central
claims in ongoing youth-led climate litigations is based on young and
future people’s inability to influence environmental decision-making,
despite the irreversible impacts it may have on their lives.129 This claim
also holds true at the intra-generational level since, owing to historical
class-, gender-, and race-based discriminations, the social groups that are
the most impacted by environmental harms are underrepresented in
decision-making processes and, more broadly, in political and legal
institutions. 130 The concerns, experiences, and knowledges of front-line
communities are hence being discounted—a form of “epistemicide” that
puts their livelihood at even greater risk.131 We hold that enabling greater
public involvement in environmental governance might offer levers to
disrupt these intergenerational cycles of exclusion and harm. Lacking the
space to reflect two decades of scholarship on the “representation” of
future generations, or the expanding literature on participatory governance
practices, we limit our analysis here to two empirical cases that have
experimented with public deliberation to foster intergenerational solidarity
at national and local scales respectively.
1. A Collective Definition of the Future in Wales
Beyond the innovative character of Wales’s Well-being of Future
Generations Act and the future generations commissioner, a less often
discussed aspect of the country’s comprehensive reform is the role given
to the public in the development of its future-oriented governance model.
As Jane Davidson highlights, “greater engagement in the democratic
process, a stronger citizen voice and active participation in decision
making are fundamental to the well-being of future generations.”132 Public
participation in Wales has taken different forms. First, civil society’s input
has nurtured the elaboration of the Well-being of Future Generations Act.
A broad national conversation, The Wales We Want, was launched in
129
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February 2014 with a two-fold objective: mainstreaming the idea of a law
to protect future generations among a potentially sceptical public and
collecting communities’ visions and aspirations for Wales by 2050. 133
Thousands of people, schools, and civil society organizations took part in
the conversations, surveys, and events organized across the country. A
network of 150 “Future Champions” was also created to represent different
geographic groups and communities of interest. The national consultation
led to the publication in 2015 of “The Wales We Want Report: A Report
on Behalf of Future Generations,” which helped define the seven wellbeing goals outlined in the Act. 134 The report also highlighted the
differences between people’s visions and the values that the government
had or had not prioritized: climate change, for instance, appeared as the
single most critical issue for participants, while the government had
originally failed to make it a top priority.135
Second, public participation in Wales is inscribed in the delivery of the
Well-being of Future Generations Act. The section of the law that focuses on
“improving local well-being” requests that all local public service boards
assess the state of economic, social, environmental, and cultural well-being of
communities in their area and, accordingly, set specific local well-being
objectives.136 To do so, public service boards must work in partnership with
community councils 137 and must consult representatives of residents, local
professionals, trade union representatives, and, when relevant, people
involved in the maintenance of local natural resources.138 In order for the wellbeing objectives to account for the needs of a diverse population, the Act
additionally encourages public service boards to include in their assessments
a specific analysis of the well-being not only of vulnerable or disadvantaged
people but also of children and young people looked after by local
authorities.139 Just like Wales’s public bodies, the public service boards and
the community councils subjected to the Act can seek the advice of the future
generations commissioner on how to meet their local well-being objectives,
and they must publish an annual report on the progress made in doing so.
133
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Lastly, and beyond the Well-being of Future Generations Act, recent
legal developments have sought to further youth political representation
and participation in Wales. This effort started in 1999 with the creation of
the Education and Youth Engagement Service that provides opportunities
for younger generations to learn and engage in the work of the country’s
National Assembly.140 In 2014, the assembly additionally signed a Young
Person’s Charter, committing to further account for young people’s
opinions.141 In the same year, the Campaign for the Children and Young
People’s Assembly for Wales was launched, and, two years later,
lawmakers approved the creation of a dedicated Welsh Youth
Parliament.142 The new institution counts sixty members aged eleven to
eighteen who have been elected for a two-year term. 143 During their
mandate, youth representatives focus on three main themes identified
through a national survey.144 The output of their work is discussed with
relevant ministries as well as within the National Assembly. In line with
these innovative reforms, Wales has in 2020 extended the right to vote in
parliamentary elections to youth aged sixteen and seventeen. 145 Only a
dozen countries around the world have lowered the voting age under
eighteen, and the topic remains hotly debated, including in Canada.146
What is particularly striking in Wales is the broad range of methods
embraced to enhance public participation at various levels of lawmaking
and policy-making processes. This effort to include a diversity of voices
in the definition of the country’s future has particularly focused on the
creation of opportunities for youth to get educated, trained, and durably
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involved in Wales’s political life. More research is needed to assess how
the age of elected representatives, and of voters, affects intergenerational
thinking and the representation of future interests. Nonetheless,
accounting for younger people’s opinions is a matter of procedural justice
not only between present and future generations but also within the current
generation. Indeed, among 148 national parliaments recently surveyed by
the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the average age of parliamentarians was
50.5 years, while half of the global population today is under the age of
thirty.147 Incidentally or not, women represent only 25.77 percent of the
total number of members of parliament in respondent countries.148 In line
with Hiskes’ observations on the reciprocal relation between present and
future environmental justice, 149 we hold that working towards
intergenerational equity starts with the redress of present, intersectional
inequities. As a settler state, Canada gathers exceptionally diverse
communities, and it would be advised to learn from the participatory
experiences developed in countries like Wales if it were to enable the
collective definition of a just and sustainable future. Besides the
participatory mechanisms developed in national political settings, other
experiences to learn from include experimentations conducted in local
governance processes, as in the last case to which we now turn.
2. “Intergenerational” Negotiations on the Future of a Japanese Town
Over the last two decades, a number of studies have supported the idea of
representing the interests of future generations through contemporary
“proxies.” Bernice Bovenkerk argues that such mechanisms would
provide future generations with a political voice and ensure that long-term
interests consistently remain on the public agenda.150 Scenarios abound—
from the idea of reserving a number of seats in parliament for “future”
proxy candidates, to the introduction of parliamentary quotas for youth as
trustees for future generations, and to the institutionalization of
deliberative mini-publics concerned with future-sensitive issues. 151
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Developed in theory more than in practice, most of these propositions have
lacked empirical grounding. The case we are focusing on is to our
knowledge one of the first experiments that included future proxies in an
actual political setting. Mobilizing participants’ sense of anticipation and
imagination, it offers an original way to address the epistemic and
motivational determinants of intergenerational injustices.
The experiment took place as part of a study developed in partnership
between researchers at Osaka University, the Research Institute for Future
Design at Kochi University, and city officials in Yahaba, a Japanese town of
twenty-seven thousand inhabitants. In line with the work of municipal
officers to prepare a policy document addressing population decline and the
revitalization of the local economy, researchers conceived of a “future design
workshop” aimed at creating a collective vision for the town in 2060. 152
Based on role play and participatory deliberation methods, the series of
workshops held in 2015 gathered twenty Yahaba residents as well as eight
facilitators including four town hall employees. Participants were divided
into four groups, two of which were asked to assume that they had timetravelled to 2060, in order to represent the town’s future generation.153 Over
five sessions, the groups were first introduced to the evolution of Yahaba
since 1970, before being invited to separately discuss and craft policy
proposals for the town in 2060. Towards the end of the workshop, twelve
proposals from the present generation groups and twelve from the future
generation groups were selected by organizers; each group was then asked to
rank the ten proposals they found to be the most important. During the last
session, researchers paired up the present and future generation groups and
asked them to elaborate, through an “intergenerational process of negotiation
and consensus building,” a final list of ten priority measures.154
As an increasing number of jurisdictions are seeking to equip
themselves with future-oriented governance mechanisms, this study
provides interesting insights on the potentials of anticipatory deliberative
methods. Among the ten final policy measures chosen by the workshop
participants, more than half had been formulated by the future generation
groups, revealing that the “intergenerational” negotiation “made the
‘Youth Quotas, Diversity, and Long-Termism: Can Young People Act as Proxies
for Future Generations?’ in González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 91, 265;
Simon Niemeyer & Julia Jennstål, “The Deliberative Democratic Inclusion of
Future Generations” in González-Ricoy & Gosseries, ibid, 247.
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Municipality in Japan” (2019) 14 Sustainability Science 1605.
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present-generation groups more aware of, and sympathetic to the thinking
of the future generation.”155 Moreover, the researchers highlight the fact
that the proposals formulated by the future generations groups reflected a
greater sensitivity to a reasoned use of local resources as well as to future
technological, physical, and social issues. Overall, they note, “the present
generation regarded the future as an extension of the present time, so they
created visions that resolved present challenges within existing institutions
and constraints”; future generation groups, by contrast, “were more
creative and worked to depict the future from the values and lifestyles they
envisioned for the year 2060, and tended to give priority to the resolution
of problems that were the most complicated and time-consuming.”156
The “future design workshop” conducted in Yahaba provides an
empirical example of how thinking intergenerationally can enhance a sense of
solidarity between present and future generations and help strike a balance
between the satisfaction of short-term needs and a concern for longer-term
societal challenges. It additionally shows that public participation and
pluralism make it possible to avert the “tunnel vision” often induced by
technocratic governance and expert decision-making.157 In 2019, a new study
developed by the Research Institute for Future Design (Kochi University)
mobilized a similar methodology to address solid waste management in
Kathmandu, Nepal. 158 The outcome of the field experiment once again
confirmed that the use of future proxies in public deliberations can broaden
participants’ temporal considerations and inform their choices towards more
sustainable options.159 While such anticipatory methodologies are still in their
infancy, it is tempting to contemplate the perspectives they might offer in the
reform of local environmental governance practices in domains such as urban
planning or environmental impact assessments.
Developing a practice of intergenerational environmental justice will
take a comprehensive toolbox more than a single tool. The model
developed in Wales clearly illustrates that a whole-of-government
approach to sustainability is more likely to uphold intergenerational equity
than a piecemeal focus on environmental regulations. As the institutional,
legal, and deliberative experimentations outlined in the last part of our
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commentary have shown, crafting farsighted governance practices
requires not only incremental cultural change in political stakeholders and
the broader public but also the increased representation of communities—
living and future—that have traditionally been overlooked in
environmental decision-making. In Canada, developing the conditions for
intergenerational environmental justice will go hand in hand with
redressing the intergenerational injustices perpetuated by the extractive
logics and violence of settler colonialism. In the words of Leanne
Betasamosake Simpson, this involves visioning “our way out of the
cognitive box of imperialism” and accounting for Indigenous knowledges
and legal traditions as we elaborate future-oriented political institutions
and practices.160 Doing so, and honouring the fundamental rights of all
future beings, entails transforming our material and governance
infrastructures as much as our knowledge and imagination infrastructures.
IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The warnings recently issued by the IPCC on the imminence of irreversible
impacts of climate change, highlight the specific responsibilities of
Canada—one of the “worst performers of all G7 nations”—towards the
international community as much as towards the communities that live
under its laws.161 Irreversibility of impacts would seem to harken directly
back to the core of Brown Weiss’s concern that action taken by today’s
generations does not “unduly restrict” the options of future generations.
Developing a detailed proposal for Canada to implement actionable and
robust mechanisms to protect the interests of future generations falls outside
of the scope of this commentary, but we suggest that the time is past due to
reopen discussions building on the Standing Committee on Environment
and Sustainable Development’s recommendation to appoint an advocate for
future generations. Our hope is that the questions and experiences explored
in Part IV of this article further illustrate concrete ways that a relational
account of intergenerational environmental justice could be operationalized.
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back: Stories of
Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence and a New Emergence (Winnipeg: ARP
Books, 2011) at 81.
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Everyone’s interests are forged in relation to others and realized through a
broader set of institutional and structural relations. These relations are for us
to remake, as adrienne maree brown says, not in the “far off future” but now.
We need to begin a broad-ranging public engagement on how to best
represent in our collective decision-making the interests of future
generations and the different social groups and knowledge systems that
coexist in Canada. Constitutional recognition of rights for young and
future generations is a worthy goal, as argued, and these claims must at the
very least succeed. But constitutional recognition will not be sufficient.
There is no “silver bullet” to attend to intergenerational injustices, and a
plurality of tools and approaches are required to enable adequate
responses.162 Further, the acceptability of future-oriented policies depends
on cultural changes at the level of both policy-makers and their
constituents. We will need to focus on cultural and social change in
addition to legal and institutional reforms and to engage a broad and
diverse set of communities in this journey. Process and outcomes are
intertwined; focusing on just relations today will go a long way into the
future. We wish to stress our finding that the best fit with the core of the
climate justice problem is to approach generational rights (and
environmental rights) as collective rights. The task falls to us to begin the
work of building the institutional, legal, and cultural framework to shape
resilient ecosystems and communities tomorrow and, along the way, to
become better neighbours and ancestors today.
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